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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
"We're really not that kind of people" 
With multi-colored revolutions bursting out all over the former Soviet Union, it 
would seem natural to consider the possibility of Russia having its own colorful 
revolution.  While the election of Boris Yel'tsin, the failure of the pushchists and 
the assertion of Russian statehood seemed like revolutionary acts, Russia's 
independence was won not by raucous crowds demanding that their voices, and 
votes, be counted, but rather by three older gentlemen of questionable sobriety 
meeting for the weekend at a hunting lodge in the woods west of Minsk. 
 
The institutions supporting Russian democracy, such as they are, were 
weakened, perhaps corrupted, almost from the moment of their creation.  
Whether the Kremlin was the stalwart of democratic values, as in the early 
Yel'tsin years, or the Duma had the authority to check a powerful president 
(Putin's first year?), all such structures have been overrun: either by bureaucratic 
infighting (could anything be more grotesque than the scramble between 
apparatchik factions over Gazprom's and Rosneft's oil revenues?); or 
hyperextension in the executive branch's grasp for authority.  
 
President Putin has done little to instill confidence that his regime is capable of 
fulfilling even its most basic promises to the Russian population:  security, 
stability, economic growth and, well, derzhavnost', seem set far aside while the 
Kremlin determines who will rule what region, power organ, or board of directors.  
With the military forces cinched in by low morale and lower expenditures, and 
Putin's forays on the world stage appearing as defensive efforts in anger 
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management, Russia's great power status totters, just like the regimes of former 
Soviet neighbors.  
 
However, revolution requires passion, and Russia has been too torrid throughout 
the 1990s, over privatization, ideology, land reform, economics and corruption to 
spare any ardor for state politics.  Putin landed in power with the promise to 
strengthen the authority of the state – to make those who would steal, or terrorize 
– fear the reprisal of a renewed Russian state.  He failed.  Western fears that the 
President usurps regional authority could not have the same impact in this 
context:  why should one worry about central control over the regions, when it 
appears just as ineffective as true regional authority? 
 
Still, the population is uncertain.  Jitters remain from terrorist attacks in the air 
and at concerts and schools.  The country, led by a President who is younger, 
more robust, but ultimately just as constrained as was Yel'tsin, is moving forward, 
but in what direction?  According to one of Russia's leading pollsters, Yuri 
Levada, "People aren't certain about anything.  Not certain about tomorrow, 
about their jobs, not certain they can earn enough, or what will happen to their 
children."  (1) 
 
The political array is again (still?) rife with clannish infighting:  hardliners and 
reformers; economists and Petersburgers; westerners and siloviki.  And while 
this crop of solons and bureaucrats tussle in a state-sponsored tug-o-war, 
opportunities for change evaporate. 
 
Will concern for the future bloom into full-colored revolutionary fervor?  Levada 
thinks not, "We don't have the leaders, and we're really not that kind of people." 
(2) 
 
It is, nonetheless, disconcerting that the most cohesive political opposition in 
Russia currently falls along the red-brown end of the spectrum.  The usual 
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democratic suspects have reappeared in the news of late, but there does seem 
to be a recognition that relying on the Yavlinsky-Nemtsov- Khakamada factions 
to find common ground, or a single common candidate is asking for too much.  
New blood might be needed to reinvigorate the democratic corps.  If the 
democratic opposition really could unify behind one candidate, then that would 
be revolutionary – perhaps it would even be a revolution of a different color. 
 
Modest reformer 
CIS Affairs have a new advocate:  a "political technologist" to consult on issues 
of foreign and cultural affairs, Modest Kolerov. (3)  Kolerov has been tapped to 
head the newly-founded Kremlin Presidential Directorate for Interregional and 
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the CIS, which is structurally under 
Dmitri Medvedev's purview.  The new Directorate will deal primarily with contacts 
among states in the post-Soviet space. (4) 
 
Kolerov, who until this appointment ran the Regnum news agency, previously 
was an adviser for Uneximbank and is co-chair of a committee of political 
analysts for the Kremlin, along with Gleb Pavlovsky. (5) 
 
Gleb Pavlovsky described his co-chair as an individual with "liberal, anti-fascist, 
and counter-revolutionary views." (6) 
 
The timing of the creation of this Directorate, along with the appointment of 
Kolerov, suggests a "soft power" approach to CIS relations, as was discussed at 
a recent Security Council meeting (See previous NIS Observed).  Kolerov 
described the aims of the Directorate to "promote Russian language, education, 
and culture abroad."  In response to questions about the Directorate's political 
agenda, Kolerov replied, "Social problems evolve into political problems when 
they go unsolved.  We will try to resolve social issues to avoid political problems." 
(7) 
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 Source Notes: 
 
(1) The Financial Times, 5 Apr 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Kommersant, 25 Mar 05; What the Papers Say (WPS) via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(4) The Moscow Times, 24 Mar 05 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Kommersant, 23 Mar 05; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(7) The Moscow Times, Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
Pity the poor Russian security services these days.  Tasked with the thankless 
job of "mopping-up" operations in and around Chechnya (operations that began 
in 1999, on the heels of the second Russian military intervention in the region) 
(1), they are being attacked, literally and figuratively, from all directions. March 
has been a particularly brutal month for them. 
 
Within days after the Federal Security Service (FSB) scored a "victory" with its 
reported assassination of former Chechen leader Maskhadov, well-traveled 
reporter Nabi Abdullaev's exposé in the Moscow Times documented how "the 
heavy-handed tactics by police and security forces in Dagestan have helped 
Islamic extremists recruit young fighters to their cause." (2) This "cause" has 
coalesced fighters into a group known by the police as Jenet (Arabic for 
"paradise") led by known radical Rasul Makhasharipov.  This group has identified 
itself on the Kavkaz Center website as Sharia Jamaat, or the Organization for 
Muslim Justice, and it has described its attacks on security forces as retribution 
against those who are "severely torturing people, humiliating their human dignity 
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and mocking their religious principles." (3)  The group is said to have killed 
dozens of law enforcement personnel since hostilities began in the region nearly 
six years ago. (4)   Abduallaev's lengthy article cited several specific cases of 
abuse by police and other security forces in the region and described the 
resulting backlash, casting the security services in a decidedly poor light. 
 
In defending government forces charged with abuse, Dagestani government 
officials have proclaimed their methods completely legal.  "This harshness is 
forced upon those who want to counter the growth of extremism. In fact, it was 
the Dagestani authorities that created the legal basis to fight religious 
extremism," said Dagestan's Minister of Information.  (5)  This "legal basis" is a 
controversial 1999 law that allows "law enforcement agencies to prosecute 
people for possessing religious literature that the Spiritual Board of Dagestani 
Muslims viewed as Wahhabi in nature." (6)  
 
It would seem, then, that the Kremlin's cure for regional violence has become 
worse than the underlying disease itself, or so claims Human Rights Watch, 
which issued its own critique of Russian methods in the region in March.  
Releasing a report titled Worse Than a War: "Disappearances² in Chechnya—a 
Crime Against Humanity, the organization chastised the Russian government for 
allowing the violence in and around Chechnya. "Chechen fighters have 
committed unspeakable acts of terrorism in Chechnya and in other parts of 
Russia. In addition to enforced disappearances, Russia¹s federal forces, together 
with pro-Moscow Chechen forces, also have committed numerous other crimes 
against civilians, including extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary detention 
and looting." (7)   The report made the following observation:  "While in previous 
years, Russian forces were the main perpetrators of 'disappearances,' over the 
last year they seem to have been replaced largely by Chechen security forces . . 
. most of which are effectively under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov." (8) 
Even with a plan of Chechenization, whereby the Kremlin allows pro-Moscow 
Chechen forces to take control of the region's defense, Russian security services 
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cannot escape critique from abroad.  Indeed, with the son of the slain pro-
Moscow Chechen leader and the current head of internal security in Chechnya, 
Kadyrov in the role of Moscow's "friend" in the region, who needs enemies? 
 
Nezavisimaya gazeta appeared to ask a similar question when Russian Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov reported that the total number of Russian troops in the 
region had increased to 80,000, up from 75,000 reported in October 2003, when 
only 33,000 of that number were military.  This, again, during a phase of 
"mopping-up" operations, not war.  The 5,000 additional troops appear to be 
mainly special forces and police.  Nezavisimaya gazeta speculates that federal 
forces in the region were strengthened not because of the need to increase 
pressure on the rebels, but because of a need to check the power of Kadyrov's 
indigenous forces. 
 
Adding to the condemnation of the rampant violence in the region, the U.S. State 
Department released its own review of human rights across the globe in March.  
That report paints a similarly bleak picture of Russian efforts in the region.   
 
"The [Russian] Government¹s record [on human rights] remained poor in 
Chechnya, where there were credible reports of serious violations, including 
numerous reports of unlawful killings and abuses of civilians by both federal 
security forces and Chechen government security forces. . . . Law enforcement 
personnel reportedly engaged in torture, violence, and other brutal or humiliating 
behavior, often with impunity." (9) 
 
With a bit more balance than the Human Rights Watch report, however, the State 
Department report recognized the fact that rebel forces bore some responsibility 
for the violence in the region as well:  "The United States also called on Chechen 
fighters to end terrorist acts and violence against civilians, repudiate terrorism, 
and cut all ties to Chechen and international terrorists."  Extending a diplomatic 
olive branch to Moscow, the report reaffirmed the official U.S. stance on 
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Chechnya:  "The United States recognizes the territorial integrity of the Russian 
Federation." (10) This, even though it may disagree with the methods employed 
in protecting that territorial integrity.  
 
As if such attacks from human rights groups and its greatest ally in the war on 
terror were not enough, Russia's own human rights ombudsman piled onto the 
charge.  In what was described as a wide-ranging annual report, Vladimir Lukin 
criticized both the government forces and the rebels for human rights abuses in 
the region, "including killings, abductions and unauthorized arrests."  Although 
the report was published in Rossiiskaya gazeta, it does not appear to be 
influential, despite the fact that it has been presented to the Russian president 
and prime minister on its way to the Duma.  (11)  Still, it could be seen as part of 
a disheartening trend, especially considering charges from Presidential Envoy 
Dmitri Kozak, who earlier this year criticized the whole anti-terror structure in the 
Caucasus and recommended federal forces be given the lead in anti-terror 
operations. (See previous NIS Observed.) 
 
As evidence of a countervailing trend, or perhaps just to stem the tide of 
indignant press, Sergei Lapin, Interior Ministry OMON (special forces) officer was 
tried and convicted in a Groznyy courthouse "of power abuse and forgery" while 
working with the police in Chechnya.  These charges rose from the detention, 
beating, and the subsequent disappearance of a 22-year old Groznyy man by 
Lapin in 2001.  The victim's remains have yet to be located. Lapin's sentence 
was 11 years of detention in a hard labor camp.  Ramzan Kadyrov hailed the 
verdict as a success of the rule of law in Chechnya, adding that "the republic's 
population enjoys the protection of the Russian constitution."  Somewhat 
surprisingly, Itar-TASS reported that "Lapin is the first law enforcer to have been 
tried for abuse inside Chechnya over the years of the Chechen conflict."  (12) 
 
So, is there anything to be made of these events, or are they simply the annual 
lob and volley between vocal anti-Russian groups and the Kremlin's defenders?  
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First, Human Rights Watch has made a relevant observation, one that the 
Kremlin probably had made already, that atrocities in the region appear to be on 
the rise, especially atrocities attributable to pro-Moscow Chechen forces, those 
led by Kadyrov.  While it is conceivable that Moscow should favor Chechens 
killing Chechens over Russians killing Chechens, or vice versa, Kadyrov's forces 
operating with the imprimatur of the Kremlin increasingly reflect poorly on Russia.  
Moscow cannot continue to distance itself from the pro-Moscow Chechen forces 
yet still claim territorial integrity as the reason for maintaining an armed presence 
in the region.  So, President Putin and his administration are still accountable for 
the ever-widening arc of violence in the region.  The Human Rights Watch report, 
along with the others, adds impetus to the case for the de-Chechenization (to 
which this column has referred in the past), if not a wholesale de-militarization. 
 
Also, while polemicists on both sides of the debate are quick to point out U.S. 
criticism of the actions of government forces in Chechnya and surrounding 
regions, the State Department report presents the position the U.S. has 
consistently taken: While the U.S. recognizes Russia's territorial integrity, some 
solution needs to be found to stem the violence (coming from both sides), 
preferably a diplomatic solution.  
 
Finally, despite the conviction of Sergei Lapin, there does not yet appear to be 
any dramatic turnaround in Moscow's perception of abuses in the region or its 
complicity in them.  Moscow has taken note of such abuses in the past and even 
condemned them vigorously, but, apparently, they still occur regularly.  Unless 
and until Moscow's security services are held to account for actions in the region, 
expect more bleak days in the Caucasus.  And for that maybe we should pity the 
Chechens too. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) Goble, Paul, "Analysis From Washington - Deadlines Military And 
Journalistic," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 Dec 99 via 
(http://www.rferl.org/features/1999/12/f.ru.991229165149.asp). 
(2) Abdullaev, Nabi, "A Murderous Cycle of Revenge in Dagestan," The Moscow 
Times, 15 Mar 05, p. 1 via (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/03/15 
/002.html). 
(3) Ibid; and "Leaflets, Weapons of Mujahideen," 25 May 04, from Kavkaz Center 
via (http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2004/05/25/2820.shtml). 
(4) Abdullaev, and Getmanskiy, Konstantin, "Special Services Warn of Further 
Terrorist Acts and Try to Avert Them," Izvestiya, 18 Jan 05; FBIS-SOV-2005-
0119 via World News Connection. 
(5) Abdullaev. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Press Conference announcing the release of Worse Than a War:  
³Disappearances² in Chechnya—a Crime Against Humanity, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 21 Mar 05 via 
(http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/21/russia10342.htm). 
(8) Worse Than a War:  ³Disappearances² in Chechnya—a Crime Against 
Humanity, Human Rights Watch, Mar 05, p. 10. 
(9) Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2004 – 2005, 
U.S. Department of State, 28 May 20, p. 143. 
(10) Ibid, p. 145. 
(11) Henry Meyer, "Russia's Ombudsman Denounces 'Large-Scale' Abuses In 
Chechnya," The Associated Press, 31 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis. (For more on 
Lukin's remarks, please see "Domestic IssuesŠ" above.) 
(12) "Russian Officer Gets Jail Time for Abuses in Chechnya," Chechnya 
Weekly, Vol VI, Issue 13, The Jamestown Foundation, 30 Mar 05, and "Police 
Officer's Trial Shows Laws Effective in Chechnya – Kadyrov," Itar-TASS, 29 Mar 
05, via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
Kyrgyz relations 
Moscow appears resigned to Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev's fall from power, 
claiming that it will not cause deterioration in Russian-Kyrgyz relations. Akayev 
and his family are in Moscow and will remain there indefinitely, though a 
representative of the Kyrgyz opposition commented that Akayev¹s return is only a 
matter of time. (1) The Kremlin¹s handling of the Kyrgyz revolution indicates that 
it has learned from the events in Georgia and Ukraine and is attempting to avoid 
repetition of previous diplomatic mistakes. President Putin has reassured the 
new Kyrgyz leadership of continuing bilateral relations, received assurances 
regarding the future of the Russian airbase at Kant, and has at least shown a 
veneer of support and acceptance of the new Kyrgyz government. (2) 
Stabilization of the country is of primary importance, as the implications of the 
Kyrgyz revolution, and the potential for other revolutions in post-Soviet Central 
Asia, are certainly a concern to the Kremlin. Moscow¹s influence wanes each 
time a revolution occurs and Russia appears powerless to stop the forces of 
political. 
 
Support for Lukashenko 
President Putin recently met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko at 
the Black Sea Resort of Sochi, in what has been described as a ³sign of military 
and strategically motivated thaw in relations.² (3) The question of the Belarus 
switch to the Russian ruble, agreement upon transit of natural gas, future WTO 
accession and joint air defense policies, were among the ³household² issues the 
two leaders discussed. Of equal importance were putative Putin support for 
Lukashenko in the 2006 election and Moscow¹s desire to keep Belarus in its 
sphere of influence.  Belarus currently is the only neighboring European country 
primarily subject to Russian influence and not looking to NATO, though there is 
some domestic opposition to these positions. Russia would not welcom a ³velvet² 
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revolution occurring in Belarus, further undermining Russian control in the post-
Soviet space, but with Belarus as a major trading partner, Moscow has no choice 
but to support Lukashenko, at least economically, if not militarily. (4) 
 
The fate of the CIS 
At a recent session of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), 
several leading officials, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 
discussed strategies designed to reverse the process of Russia¹s geopolitical 
retreat in its ³backyard.² (5) Council members stressed the crisis faced by 
Moscow, as reflected in the recent colored revolutions in the CIS, and the 
general loss of leadership and influence Russia is viewed as ceding to the West. 
Although some CIS countries have chosen economic partnership with Russia, 
Russia has ceased to be politically ³interesting in the long-term.² (6) Predictably, 
the states of the former Soviet Union will continue to turn away from Russia in 
coming years if these trends continue, Council members feared, and the United 
States, China, the European Union and other major players will gain greater 
influence in the CIS. 
 
Three scenarios of CIS development were discussed at the SVOP gathering. 
One argued that the status quo would be maintained, with the CIS as ³a 
convenient platform for informal dialogue amongst the leaders of the former 
Soviet republics.² (7) The second proposal sought to bolster a smaller CIS, 
concentrating efforts on one or two countries or groups; this could make the CIS 
a more manageable space, and could further Russian partnership with China. 
The merging of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) into one entity could allow for the creation of a new integrated territory 
from Belarus to China, providing competition with the West. (8) The third 
approach advocated the complete disbandment of the CIS. Some members of 
the group commented that ³The CIS has fulfilled its mission [which was] designed 
specifically for the transition period² and that ³after last year¹s Ukrainian election 
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fiasco, the CIS ceased to exist as a more or less coherent geopolitical space.² (9) 
Complete disintegration of the CIS, however, whether already in process or not, 
would be a worst-case scenario for Russian authority and security, and, at least 
according to the members of the SVOP, it would leave an even larger vacuum of 
influence that the West could exploit. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs chief spokesman, Aleksander Yakovenko, qualified 
some of the pessimism stemming from the recent discussion, saying that the CIS 
is by no means at the end of its life and remains necessary. (10) Moscow has 
asserted the idea of ³humanitarian cooperation² amongst CIS countries which 
includes a range of social issues to promote the rights of Russian-speaking 
populations, ³cultural space,² ³education space,² all of which would attempt to 
preserve the Russian language, mass media and influence in the region. 
Economic cooperation and financial ties, as seen in Moscow¹s relations with 
Belarus, remain the most likely interaction for the time being. Citing economic 
cooperation as a top priority, Aleksander Lebedev remarked, ³Speculative inter-
state constructions based on political declarations and reminiscences of former 
state unity have demonstrated their uselessness.² (11) The future of the CIS and 
the strategic confusion it has caused Russia, will no doubt remain in the forefront 
of Moscow¹s political, strategic and economic consciousness. Its ³backyard² 
seems to be shrinking. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) RIA Novosti, 4 April 2005; 15:49 GMT via (http://en.rian.ru). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) RIA Novosti, 5 April 2005; 12:40 GMT via (http://en.rian.ru). 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 Apr 05, Vol 2, issue 64, ³Russia¹s Political Class is 
Split Over How to Proceed With Integration of Post-Soviet Space² via 
(www.jamestown.org). 
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(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) RIA Novosti, 1 Apr 05, 13:33 GMT via (http://en.rian.ru). 
(9) Ibid., Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 Apr 05, Vol 2 issue 64. 
(10) Eurasia Daily Monitor, 31 Mar 05, Vol 2, issue 63, ³Putin Obituary for CIS.² 
(11) Ibid., Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 Apr 05, Vol 2, issue 64. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Duma proposals for the North Caucasus 
As a means of weighing in on the Beslan crisis and larger Caucasus affairs, the 
Duma, in the wake of the September hostage-taking, created its own 
Commission on the Problems of the North Caucasus. The commission¹s 
recommendations, announced on 31 March, appear less than helpful, although 
they fall into line with the hopes of the president's plenipotentiary representative 
to the Southern Federal District, Dmitri Kozak. Kozak recently convened a 
meeting of the district¹s governors as part of an attempt to promote economic 
development in the region. (1) 
 
The commission¹s proposals ranged from reviving the practice of sheep-farming 
and other traditional agricultural employments in the region to the suggestion of 
eliminating police checkpoints and guard posts on highways. It also 
recommended migration to the region by Russian-speaking Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) citizens supposedly as a means of easing the area¹s 
difficult interethnic relationships. However, an influx of ethnic Russians hardly 
seems likely to soothe ethnic tensions. The commission also proposed an 
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information and propaganda center, which would work on brushing up the 
region¹s negative image. (2) 
 
The report by the Beslan parliamentary investigation committee, headed up by 
the Federation Council, is expected to be ready around the end of April. 
Hopefully, its findings and proposals will prove more conclusive than the Duma 
commission's. 
 
Human rights report 
The 2004 human rights report by ombudsman Vladimir Lukin has been published 
finally. The report was ready on 31 January but has been withheld for the last two 
months. Lukin found that the state of human rights in Russia was unsatisfactory, 
with "the right of an individual to life and limbŠnot guaranteed effectively." (3)  
Lukin, who is a founding member of Yabloko, reported that the abuse and 
violation of the rights of migrants and refugees by police and other law-
enforcement agencies is increasing. He also assigned responsibility for the 
human rights violations in Chechnya to both sides of the conflict. (4) 
 
Political parties 
Speculation continues to circulate about a possible merger between the Union of 
Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko parties as well as the potential teaming up of 
SPS, Yabloko, and another party, Committee 2008, headed by Vladimir Ryzhkov, 
Garry Kasparov, and Irina Khakamada. SPS announced its intentions on March 
24 to continue negotiations with Yabloko and other parties about the formation of 
an integrated democratic party. Joining together would help these smaller parties 
pass the requisite threshold to take those mandates in parliament that are 
distributed according to proportional representation. 
 
One issue of debate regarding a putatively united democratic party revolved 
around whether to build a united front on the basis of already existing parties or 
whether to dissolve these parties and start afresh. The emerging consensus 
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seems to be that building on the structure of previously existing parties will 
constitute the more effective approach. (5) 
 
Committee 2008 announced recently that it is forming a panel to develop a 
common policy for the putative party. Agreement between SPS, Yabloko and 
Committee 2008 has been difficult to achieve. Yabloko and Committee 2008 hold 
differing positions about the prospective party¹s base. Yabloko staunchly 
opposes the inclusion of "oligarchs" in the party¹s structure; Committee 2008 
advocates a party that derives most of its support from a strong grassroots base 
in the regions. (6) Clashes between the leading personalities of each party also 
appear likely reemerge. Given these areas of disagreement, it will be interesting 
to see what Committee 2008 can create as a common democratic platform. 
 
Public Chamber 
The third and final reading of the public chamber bill was passed in the Duma on 
16 March and in the Federation Council on 23 March. The chamber, to be 
composed of members of regional and national NGOs and charged with 
providing recommendations about legislation to the Duma and Federation 
Council, will also be responsible for producing an annual report on the state of 
Russian civil society. The chamber will have its own 60-minute state television 
program, printed publication, and website. (7) None of its actions will have the 
force of law.   
 
The public chamber will operate under a code of conduct drafted, according to 
Federation Council speaker Sergei Mironov¹s speculations, by the members of 
the chamber. In this aspect, it is worth noting that the public chamber will be 
subject to such a code while the bodies it is assigned to monitor operate under 
no such requirement. (8)  The new chamber could hold its first meeting by 4 
November. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) ³New organization to promote regional investment projects,² Itar-Tass, 28 Mar 
05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) ³Russian Duma's wide-ranging North Caucasus recommendations 'naive' 
report,² Izvestiya, 1 Apr 05 via World News Connection (WNC). 
(3) ³Human rights and media situation in Russia unsatisfactory, says 
ombudsman,² BBC Monitoring, 24 Mar 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(4) ³Russian official paper publishes long-awaited ombudsman's report,² BBC 
Monitoring, 31 Mar 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(5) ³SPS to go on talks on united democratic party with Yabloko,² Ria novosti, 24 
Mar 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) ³The Union of Right Forces wouldn¹t mind Mikhail Kasianov,² Gazeta, 28 Mar 
05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) ³Daily comments on expected Kremlin control of new public chamber,² 
Financial Times Information, 20 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) ³TV remarks by Federation Council speaker Sergei Mironov,² Podrobnosti 
Program, 23 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
Rokhlin's ghost? 
Discontent in the Russian arms forces, exacerbated by "benefit reforms," 
appears to be fertile soil for groups looking to bring a political challenge to the 
Kremlin and it seems that a group has stepped up to do just that.  (See previous 
NIS Observed 31 Jan and 10 Dec 04) Led by the former head of the Defense 
Ministry¹s department for international cooperation, Colonel-General Leonid 
Ivashov, the Russian Military Union is working with other security-oriented private 
organizations to garner political support.  In February, several demonstrations 
were held in conjunction with the gathering of more than 1,000 delegates for the 
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Pan-Russian Officers Congress, organized by Ivashov and his groups. (1)  
Building on concerns over low morale, caused by the degeneration of the socio-
economic status of the armed forces and the recent monetization of benefits, the 
Congress built the foundation and filled the ranks of its own militia.  ³The 
Volunteer Troops,² estimated to be more than 3,000,000 strong, now has 
appointed leadership (nearly all of whom are/were generals or admirals), 
formalized an organizational structure, and detailed its strategy. (2)  They 
represent the combination of several different professional military groups 
including the Russian Military Union, the Union of Officers, and the Union of 
Cossacks.  Some very right-wing nationalist groups, such as the Russian 
National Unity movement may join in. (3)  The government harassed the group 
during its convention by locking it out of its planned venue (a large hall in the 
Academy of State Service), leaving them essentially to meet in the street.  While 
viewed by some as an outlet for civil confrontation without violence, the FSB 
regards it as an anti-state organization. (4) 
 
This movement has been likened by General Lev Rokhlin's group, to the 
Movement for Support of the Army, in the late 1990¹s. (5)  After his murder in 
1998, Rokhlin¹s aides disclosed his plans for a general uprising in the summer 
and fall of 1998, with the aim of bringing down the Yel'tsin government. (6)  The 
movement evaporated after Rokhlin¹s murder, in part because of the loss of such 
a well-respected leader (and the murder of one leader has a deterrent effect on 
prospective leaders) but the discontent remained and simmered. (7) 
 
The leaders of the current movement also include former Defense Minister Igor 
Rodionov (responsible for the 1989 Tbilisi Massacre), and former head of the 
Armed Forces Main Combat Training Directorate, Colonel-General Alexander 
Skorodumov. (8)  These are not poor soldiers, for whom it is a hardship now to 
have to pay to take the bus.  They are embittered nationalists who long for the 
glory of the Soviet Union, a large strong army, and the greatness of Russia.  
They blame the Russian government's weak mismanagement for the current 
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state of ³illness² in their great nation. Ivashov and Skorodumov are strident in 
their criticism of government policies and personalities; slightly more blunt, 
Rodionov displays the same ill feelings towards the current and past 
administrations.  He also explicitly states what others only suggest: ³It is also 
obvious that this war (in Chechnya) benefits America, which has long since 
implanted plenty of its agents and 'advisors' in the Kremlin, the government, the 
Defense Ministry, and the special services. The United States has a direct 
interest in keeping the embers of war in the Caucasus constantly smoldering, 
sapping the strength of an already-drained Russia still further: aren't the recent 
events in Georgia sufficient evidence of that?² (9)  The leadership of this group 
has been individually ousted from the Kremlin for impeding efforts at reform, not 
only military but foreign policy as well.  Although Yel'tsin and Putin have had 
different approaches to dealing with the West, at one time or another both 
administrations have claimed that Russia faces no ³great power² threat and that, 
while not yet an ally, the West is not the enemy either.  Putin believes that the 
path to greatness must start with a strong economy that will eventually give 
Russia the capability to project hard and soft power globally.  The ³rogue 
generals,² on the other hand, clearly only perceive the "threat" posed to Russia 
by NATO and the U.S., and therefore believe that the only possible path to 
security and great power status is to re-build the Red Army.  Their concern is not 
with the servicemen, but rather with their perception of Russian greatness.  The 
servicemen and pensioners are simply an available political resource to mobilize.  
 
Thus far, Ivanov seems to have ignored reform and rearmament of the core of 
the Red Army.  The tank divisions (there were 50,000 battle tanks in the Red 
Army in 1988) are all below 50% in manning and in the lowest state of readiness 
of any army units. (10)  The powerful Air Forces of the Red Army rot on the ramp, 
while the pilots get a miserable 40 hours of flying time per year.  Fewer than 84 
of the Soviet Navy¹s 196 submarines remain in service and the majority of these 
are not combat ready. (11)  Statistics like these are what upsets the rogue 
generals.  Defense Minister Ivanov does seem to understand the connection 
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between military power and international influence.  The government¹s defense 
budget has nearly doubled in real dollars since 1999. (12)  Ivanov¹s strategy for 
expenditure has focused primarily on two areas: the Russian strategic nuclear 
forces; and the development of conventional capability with mobile forces, 
through professionalism and reequipment the airborne and peacekeeping units of 
the armed forces.  These are the two areas where defense spending has 
increased most noticeably. 
 
Although claiming that the West poses no threat to Russia, there is nearly 
incessant official discussion about some aspect of Russia¹s nuclear force.  
Recent weeks have been exceptionally rich with discussions about investments, 
improvements and capabilities of nuclear missile-launching submarines, strategic 
bombers, and, of course, there is the unique missile capability that President 
Putin mentioned back in November and that continues to stir up comments from 
observers.  It¹s obvious that all of this strategic nuclear talk is not meant to 
influence the behavior of terrorists, but rather of foreign powers.  The most recent 
attempt by Ivanov to increase the visibility of Russia¹s claim to "great power" 
status is the Defense Ministry¹s decision to resurrect two dinosaurs from the 
past:  Ivanov has indicated that Russia will invest new money into its own missile 
defense system.  The Soviet Union developed a missile system, created back in 
1968, to protect Moscow and the industrial areas surrounding it.  Although there 
is no plan to rebuild the whole system, it appears Russia will upgrade portions of 
this network of radars and high-speed missiles designed to shoot down incoming 
ballistic warheads with a one megaton nuclear weapon. (13) 
 
The other relics entering discussions are the intermediate range nuclear forces 
(INF).  In his recent visit to Washington, Ivanov reportedly told U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld that Russia might back out of the INF Treaty, signed 
in 1987, that outlawed nuclear missiles with range capabilities between 500-
5,500 km. (14)  Of course, Ivanov may be planning to outfit these missiles with 
conventional warheads for use against terrorists in the south.  This seems 
 20 
unlikely considering that without GPS guidance, these missiles are not likely to 
have the accuracy required to make an operational difference with a conventional 
warhead.  It is possible that Russia¹s reconstitution of intermediate range 
missiles is not meant as a threat to NATO or China. (15)  However, if it is not 
meant as a threat, then it is most certainly a cautionary signal meant to ensure 
NATO and China are still paying attention to Russia. 
 
It should have been obvious that another troop-cut was in the works late last 
year, when Ivanov was insisting that Russia needed a million man army and that 
troop cuts were over.  This is the same scenario enacted for the last troop cuts, 
which, apparently is what is being planned for later in 2005. (16)  According to a 
report in Russkii kurier, the Russian Security Council has tabled temporarily 
discussions regarding another major overhaul of the defense ministry which 
would include such reforms as moving from six military districts to four regional 
commands, forming a new arm that would include all special operation forces 
centered on the Airborne troops and, most significantly, include a cut of 250,000-
300,000 troops from the armed forces. (17)  These personnel cuts are apparently 
a part of the already approved Armed Forces Development Plan for 2010 but 
they have been tabled, reportedly because they represent a bigger restructuring 
of all security and emergency ministries than that for which the ministers can find 
consensus.  
 
It is obvious that Ivanov confronts a broad range of pressures and political 
realities in his efforts to transform the Russian military.  Although the proposed 
downsizing is not altogether surprising, the timing apparently is not yet right to 
announce the change. And while Putin bought off some political pressure from 
the soldiers and pensioners when he raised their salaries 20% earlier this spring, 
the situation is clearly not stable enough to tell a quarter of a million military 
personnel that they are out of work. 
 
Source Notes: 
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EXTERNAL 
Russia's unauthorized amphibious exercise 
On the morning of 23 March the NIKOLAI FILCHENKOV, a thirty year-old 
Russian Alligator type IV large landing ship commenced an unauthorized 
amphibious landing at the Ukrainian Mount Opuk military training area on the 
southeast coast of Crimea. The landing was supposed to be the main component 
of an annual Russian exercise normally conducted during April, but in this case 
the exercise never received Ukrainian approval.  Whether viewed as a simple 
military blunder or a deliberate political test, this incident highlights the still 
contentious issue of the prolonged stationing of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in 
Ukrainian territory, and the lack of coordination between the Ukrainian and 
Russian militaries and governments with respect to the Black Sea Fleet's 
activities.  
 
The Russian amphibious ship, based in Sevastopol, picked up the Russian 
based landing party in Novorossiysk, Russia on 22 March.  She was underway 
the same day and crossed into Ukrainian territorial waters outside of Feodosiya 
later that night. The Russian ship appropriately notified the Ukrainian authorities 
prior to entering Ukrainian territorial waters, but did not provide any information 
regarding the landing party or military exercise. (1) The NIKOLAI FILCHENKOV 
then proceeded to the exercise area and began landing the personnel and 
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hardware of the Black Sea Fleet's 382nd marine battalion based in Temryuk, 
Krasnodar Krai.  In all, 142 persons and 28 pieces of military equipment, mainly 
armored personnel carriers, were offloaded at the amphibious training range. 
 
After the 382nd marine personnel had essentially completed its amphibious 
landing, Ukrainian border guards, who had not received prior notification of the 
exercise, confronted them.  The border guards informed the Russian landing 
party that they were using the training range illegally.  On the morning of 24 
March, the 382nd and the NIKOLAI FILCHENKOV left the training area and 
returned to Novorossiysk. 
 
A Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson claimed that the unauthorized landing 
violated the May 28, 1997 bilateral treaty on the status and conditions of the 
Black Sea Fleet's presence on Ukrainian territory, the associated agreement on 
the Russian Fleet's use of training grounds on Ukraine's territory, the Ukrainian 
law on the procedures regarding access of foreign military units on Ukraine's 
territory, as well as Ukrainian national sovereignty. (2) The basics of the 1997 
Black Sea Fleet Agreements and its associated agreements include: 
 
1) Russia and Ukraine split the Black Sea fleet 50-50 with Russia then buying 62 
percent of Ukraine's 50 percent back with cash; 
2) Russia leased the ports and training areas in and around Sevastopol for 20 
years at $97.75 million per year, but the Russian Black Sea Fleet's land forces 
based in Russia can not use Ukraine's territory for military exercises without 
Ukrainian parliamentary approval (the issue in this case); 
3) Russia would credit Ukraine with $526 million for the use of part of the fleet, as 
well as $200 million for the 1992 transfer of Ukraine¹s nuclear arsenal to Russia. 
The payments would be applied toward Ukraine¹s $3 billion debt to Russia; (3) 
4) Russia recognized that Crimea (and the city of Sevastopol) is legally and 
territorially a sovereign part of Ukraine. (4) 
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Ukrainian reaction 
The official Ukrainian reaction to the unauthorized military exercise was 
expressed via letter on 24 March to the charge d'affaires of the Russian 
Federation in Ukraine, Yevgeni Panteleev.  The letter explained the Ukrainian 
position and demanded a Russian explanation for the uncoordinated military 
exercise. 
 
The unofficial political reaction has been varied. The head of the Ukrainian 
Security Service (SBU) Alexander Turchinov took a hard line stance.  He 
commented to Ukrainian television that "the lodgment of Russian naval forces is 
contrary to the national interests of Ukraine."(5)  While the Head of the Our 
Ukraine parliamentary faction, Yuri Karmazin, condemned the military exercise 
as an "unfriendly act of Russia with regard to Ukraine." (6) Victor Mironenko, 
head of the communist faction in the Ukrainian Parliament, took a more 
conciliatory note saying "We have to live and work together with Russia and I'd 
like not to fuel passions between our fraternal nations on this insignificant 
question." (7) 
 
Our Ukraine Parliamentary deputy Ihor Ostash verbalized his concern over the 
number of "the so-called technical mistakes and inaccuracies connected with the 
deployment and activity of Black Sea Fleet in Crimea."(8)   He called for a 
parliamentary inquiry into the unauthorized maneuvers of the Russian maritime 
infantry.  The deputy also said "We have to provide an efficient control of all 
aspects of the Russian fleet¹s activity on our territory in order to avoid any 
misunderstandings that may worsen our bilateral relations in the future. These 
events remind us about the importance of national interests and the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of our state."(9) 
 
The President and Prime Minister took a diplomatic approach.  Prime Minister 
Yulia Timoshenko said that the Ukrainian government was committed to 
complying with the Black Sea Fleet accords and that no old bilateral accords 
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were going to be revisited. "I want Russia to take us as reliable partners," 
Timoshenko said, responding to the question of whether Ukraine would look to 
modify the existing Black Sea Fleet agreement. (10)  President Viktor 
Yushchenko called the incident a "military oversight."  He also said that the 
incident was not a political provocation by Russia,  "We have accepted the 
Russians' apologies and believe that the political agreement that regulates the 
presence of the fleet was, in fact, violated, but, considering the statement that the 
Russians issued, I regard this incident as settled." (11)  At the same time, 
President Yushchenko announced that Ukraine would conduct a review of the 
Russian fleet's activities in recent years. (12) 
 
Russian reaction 
The Russian Black Sea Fleet command issued a press release that stated, "The 
incident occurred because of uncoordinated actions by the Ukrainian authorities 
and the BSF command." (13)  Andrei Krylov, the officer in charge of the Black 
Sea Fleet press office, said that the amphibious landing was carried out strictly in 
accordance with the plans of combat training of the Russian Navy coordinated 
ahead of time with the Ukrainian Naval Command. (14) 
 
The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Aleksandr Yakovenko, said that a 
Black Sea Fleet representative responded to Ukraine's letter and that the incident 
resulted from some technical misapprehension.  He claimed that the Ukrainian 
side was notified beforehand about the ship's voyage to Feodosia but that notice 
failed to reach all Ukrainian parties. Additionally, he said that the incident should 
not be over-dramatized. (15)  An unnamed source at the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs told Izvestiya that Moscow had made no "apologies," and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed that the Ukrainians had taken the press 
statement by the Black Sea Fleet as an apology. (16) 
 
According to an unnamed Izvestiya source at Russia's Defense Ministry, both 
parties are to blame: The Russians, for only notifying the Ukrainian Naval Staff 
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and the Ministry of Defense; and the Ukrainians, for not notifying their border 
guards. (17) 
 
Perhaps the most interesting reaction was from Russian Channel 3 TV 
Commentator Andrei Dobrov.  While agreeing with President Yushchenko's 
evaluation of the event as a military blunder, he thought that the strong Ukrainian 
reaction was meant to remove attention from President Yushchenko's alleged 
indecisiveness in regard to his attendance at the Russian victory day 
celebrations.  Additionally he said, "The story of the marines' landing was 
immediately blown up. They started saying again that the presence of a foreign 
fleet in Ukraine violates the country's sovereignty. Ukrainian Foreign Minister 
Borys Tarasyuk said today [28 March] that Ukraine considered the incident to be 
an attempt to violate the 1997 treaty on the Black Sea Fleet. Moreover, Tarasyuk 
stressed that there were two possible theories behind the incident: either the 
Russian authorities had no control over the actions of its Black Sea Fleet or they 
wanted to test the readiness of the new Ukrainian authorities." (18) 
 
Conclusion 
 
The issue of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine was settled almost a decade 
ago after five years of high tensions and negotiations.  That agreement will 
remain in force for 12 more years.  The fact that both the Ukrainian Navy and the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet operate in such propinquity, in geographic terms, 
requires close coordination to ensure ship safety and minimize incidents that 
could cause political tensions.  As Ukraine continues to push toward closer ties 
with Europe and NATO, the coordination between the Ukrainian and Russian 
militaries could deteriorate.  If treaty violations, such as the 23 March landing, 
continue the Ukrainian leadership will be less likely to accept lack of coordination, 
incompetence or blundering as reasonable excuses for violating national 
sovereignty.  
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
BELARUS 
UN report puts Belarus "close to" dictatorship 
A United Nations report, which came out last week, described Belarus as a 
country close to becoming a dictatorship. Adrian Severin, UN special rapporteur 
for Belarus, stated that ³a deep reform of the political system² is needed and that 
³continuous deterioration of human rights² must be halted. (1) Severin¹s report 
also claimed that Belarus posed a high threat to regional security and stability.  
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He emphasized the necessity of creating special international funds which would 
establish independent TV and radio stations that could broadcast to Belarus from 
abroad and suggested strengthening human rights education as a possible 
solution to the deteriorating human rights situation in the country. 
 
The reaction of the Belarusian authorities to the report was predictably harsh. 
The report also evoked angry criticism from Belarusian representatives to the UN 
human rights commission, who demanded an apology from Mr. Severin for 
"misrepresenting" the situation in Belarus and called Severin¹s report ³a rough 
and unambiguous insult of our country and its people.² (2) Belarusian 
representatives were backed by Russia, some African countries, Cuba and 
China. (3) 
 
The report is said to be patterned on the U.S. State Department's ³Support of 
Human Rights and Democracy 2004-2005² document. Some Belarusian 
representatives to the UN office in Geneva even expressed ironic indignation 
about the State Department not filing a complaint for plagiarism and copy right 
infringement. (4) The State Department¹s and Severin¹s opinions were supported 
by a U.S. non-governmental organization, Freedom House, which placed Belarus 
number one in its list of the most repressive societies in the world (³The Worst of 
the Worst. The World¹s Most Repressive Societies 2005²). (5) 
 
While the UN report correctly points out the deteriorating human rights situation 
in Belarus, even some of Belarusian opposition supporters found Severin¹s 
statements bizarre. Andrei Sannikov, the International Coordinator of the civic 
initiative ³Khartiya¹97,² said that Severin repeated much of what he had talked 
about in 1999. At that time, he put a lot of effort into mending the relationship 
between the Belarusian government and the opposition. Since then, the regime 
turned into an outright dictatorship, but Severin still keeps emphasizing the 
dialogue between Lukashenko and the opposition and insists on educating 
Belarusians about human rights. ³On the one hand, he talks about the 
 30 
deterioration of the human rights situation in Belarus, and on the other hand, he 
suggests extremely ineffective ways to improve the situation,² says Sannikov. (6) 
Indeed, it makes no sense to create and sponsor human rights education 
programs in Belarus, if there are no conditions to enforce human rights 
observance.  Despite the imperfect nature of the report, it is still to be hoped that 
Severin¹s account of the situation in Belarus would force UN Human Rights 
Commission to take measures towards stopping massive human rights abuses in 
the country. 
 
UKRAINE 
Constitutional reform 
Viktor Yushchenko recently confirmed his support for political reform in Ukraine, 
which would shift some powers from the president to the parliament and the 
prime-minister either on 1 September 2005 or 1 January 2006, depending on 
when the changes to the constitution regarding local self-government are 
adopted. While Yushchenko supports the idea of reform, he expressed concerns 
about the way in which the constitutional changes were approved: ³Unfortunately, 
the changes to the constitutionŠwere botched somewhat, they were adopted with 
a lot of provisos, including where it concerned the various powers of the 
government, president and parliamentŠEven so, I think that political reform 
should follow its path.² (7) 
 
Yulia Tymoshenko, prior to being elected prime-minister, held a drastically 
different opinion about constitutional reform. At a news conference on 15 
January, Tymoshenko threatened to initiate cancellation of the constitutional 
reform since, according to her, it was bound to bring ³chaos into politics.² (8) 
Tymoshenko believed that letting the reform happen would mean usurpation of 
power by the owners of parliamentary factions. ³I am opposed to this. This is not 
the right way for Ukraine¹s development,² she stated. (9) 
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The day of adopting the necessary constitutional amendments is getting closer, 
but Tymoshenko has kept surprisingly quiet about the issue since January. She 
neither made any attempts to initiate the cancellation of the reform, not did she 
comment on Yushchenko¹s recent statement. There have been no more 
emotional outbursts about her disagreement with constitutional reform since she 
was elected Prime-Minster. It might be, of course, that Mrs. Tymoshenko¹s desire 
to give up recently acquired power is not as strong as she previously thought. 
 
Ukrainians mourn Pope¹s death 
This week, thousands of Ukrainians went to churches to honor the memory of the 
late John Paul II. Many Ukrainians consider the Pope to be the reviver of the 
Ukrainian Greco-Catholic (Uniate) Church (established in 1596) after years of 
Soviet repressions. He often inspired the Uniate faithful during Soviet times, 
when followers had to practice in secret. 
 
After WWII, following the incorporation of West Ukrainian lands into the Soviet 
Union, the Uniates were forced to join Russian Orthodox Church. Now, the 
Church accepts the authority of the Vatican, but also retains traditions of the 
Eastern Orthodox religion. Hundreds of priests and their families, together with 
thousands of church followers were arrested and deported into Soviet labor 
camps. Between 1946 and 1989, the Uniate church was the largest banned 
church in the world. It was also the largest social group in the former Soviet 
Union that opposed Soviet rule. During the ban and persecutions, the Church 
lived an underground life: A clandestine system of seminaries, monasteries and 
parishes existed up until the Church¹s legalization in the late 1980s. (10) 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, approximately 2500 Orthodox parishes in 
Ukraine have become Greco-Catholic parishes. The Orthodox leadership in 
Moscow blamed John Paul II for encouraging this development and accused him 
of fostering Catholic influence in traditionally Orthodox lands. This was the main 
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reason why Patriarch Aleksei II refused to welcome the Pope to Moscow in 2001, 
after his visit to Ukraine. (11) 
 
Yushchenko acknowledged the Pope¹s achievements last Sunday by saying that: 
³In John Paul II, we have lost a manŠwho had devoted his whole life to the 
service of humanity and the Church. The Ukrainian people bow before his 
majestical accomplishments.² (12) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Voronin is elected President 
Vladimir Voronin was reelected the President of the Republic of Moldova by the 
new parliament with 75 votes. His reelection was uncertain since the Communist 
party had only 56 mandates, with 61 needed to elect the president. Two parties, 
besides his own, made Voronin¹s victory possible–the Christian Democratic 
Popular Party and the Democratic Party. (13) The Christian Democrats stated 
earlier that they would not take part in the voting (hoping to force early elections), 
but apparently changed their mind. The Democratic Party – a new faction that 
split form the Democratic Moldova Bloc (BDM) just several days before the 
elections – did exactly what others predicted it would do – gave its eight votes to 
Voronin. 
 
According to the Moldovan Constitution, at least two nominations for the 
president are needed in order for elections to take place. Vladimir Voronin was 
the only presidential candidate until, at the last minute, the Communist Party 
nominated its second candidate – George Duca, who received one vote during 
the 4 April presidential elections. 
 
In his speech to the parliament, Voronin stated that this was his ³second and last 
mandate.² He added that he would work even harder for the good of the country 
in the next four years. (14) 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
Forward to the status quo 
Over the last several years, observers have come to call the Karabakh conflict 
³frozen,³ as negotiators have made no progress toward a peace settlement and 
both sides have remained dug in at the ceasefire line of 1994. 
 
However, for fourteen families in Azerbaijan and Armenia, the conflict is far from 
static – each of these families lost sons in front-line ceasefire breaches during 
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the last month. (1) These breaches have become steadily more frequent, with 
both sides suggesting the other is responsible. Whatever the reason, less than 
four months into 2005, ceasefire violations have killed more than double those 
lost in front-line clashes throughout all of 2004. (2) This violence has been 
matched by increasing anger, appeals to international organizations for 
assistance, and militaristic rhetoric. 
 
In mid-February, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev warned that ³the patience of the 
Azerbaijani people is not inexhaustible,² and that the country¹s leaders are 
³strengthening our armed forces.²  He continued, ³The funds we spent on 
defense exceed those spent by Armenia two times, and we will further expand 
this potential. Armenia will not last long compared to Azerbaijan in terms of 
armament tempo.² (3) Armenia¹s Defense Minister responded by suggesting that 
³if hostilities resume, we will win.² (4) Similarly, Karabakh¹s former defense 
minister said, ³Is Azerbaijan really ready for a war? Simply, they seem to be 
ready. Armenia¹s and Karabakh¹s task is to have an army and economy that 
would discourage the enemy from taking such steps.² (5) 
 
This escalation of activity led both Armenia and Azerbaijan to appeal to the 
United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) for assistance. In response, the OSCE sent an ³emergency monitoring 
mission² to the contact line in Terter District. The observers noted no ceasefire 
violations during their one day of monitoring. But the mission was only one of 
several international activities focusing on Nagorno-Karabakh in recent months. 
 
 The majority of these activities were initiated at Azerbaijan¹s request and 
seemed to be an attempt to generate international support for the country¹s 
peace plan. This plan envisions a multi-step process that would begin with the 
withdrawal of ³foreign² troops from Azeri soil and end with negotiations on the 
official status of the republic. 
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To begin this process, Azerbaijan would like the international community to force 
the removal of Armenian and Karabakh troops from the occupied districts 
bordering Karabakh. The country also would like support for its attempts to have 
ethnic Armenian ³settlers² removed from those same districts. But negotiators for 
Armenia and Karabakh are insisting that Karabakh¹s status be determined before 
any troops or settlers can be withdrawn. Armenian officials suggest that the 
withdrawal of bordering troops would remove the buffer around Karabakh, thus 
allowing Azerbaijan better access for military operations. Armenia also suggests 
that the individuals settled in the occupied zones are not there at the request of 
either itself or Karabakh. 
 
The subject of the ³settlers² has been a hot one of late in Azerbaijan, as the 
country has accused Armenia of forcibly settling Armenian citizens in Karabakh 
and its bordering districts while hampering the return of Azeri refugees to these 
same areas. 
 
 In January, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
passed a resolution expressing concern over the refugee issue. A report 
attached to the resolution decried ³the creation of mono-ethnic areas which 
resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing.³ While the resolution does not 
suggest that either Armenia or Azerbaijan engaged in ethnic cleansing, the 
document criticizes Armenia and Karabakh for their occupation of the districts 
around Karabakh and calls for troops to be removed. The report also calls for the 
return of all displaced refugees to their homes – in particular the hundreds of 
thousands of Azeris displaced from Karabakh during fighting in the early 1990s. 
 
 During the debate over the resolution, the point of view of the delegates was 
clear, and there was little doubt that the majority of support was on Azerbaijan¹s 
³side.² Bulgarian parliamentarian Evgeni Kirilov said, ³We should be clear once 
and for all, and I think we are all behind this idea – there cannot be territories 
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occupied by force, or there cannot be any prospect of joining any territories by 
force to any country.² (6) 
 
Armenia responded quickly by suggesting that Azerbaijan would attempt to use 
the PACE report and resolution as a pretext to reinitiate military action in the 
districts surrounding Karabakh. However, because the report also urged 
Azerbaijan to avoid the use of force to retake territory, as well as to initiate talks 
with Karabakh representatives – a step the country has fiercely resisted as a 
matter of national pride – Azerbaijan¹s reaction to the resolution has been 
surprisingly muted. 
 
Instead, the country has intensified its attempts to find support for a U.N. General 
Assembly resolution expressing concern over Armenian settlements in its 
occupied territories. Before entertaining this request, UN representatives asked 
the OSCE Minsk Group – representatives from Russia, the United States and 
France who have been tasked by the OSCE with mediation of the conflict – to 
organize a fact-finding mission to the territories in question. Both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan supported the mission¹s work. 
 
In February, ten OSCE representatives from Finland, Italy, Sweden and 
Germany spent a week examining Azerbaijan¹s claims, concentrating on the 
districts surrounding Karabakh. In mid-March, the fact-finding mission released 
its report. This time, Armenian representatives had reason to celebrate – the 
mission did not substantiate the majority of Azerbaijan¹s claims. Although the 
presence of ethnic Armenia settlers was found in the seven districts visited, ³The 
Fact-Finding Mission concluded that the overwhelming majority of settlers are 
displaced persons from various parts of Azerbaijan, notably, from Subhuman 
(Goranboy), Get ashen (Chaikent) – now under Azerbaijani control – and 
Sumgait and Baku.² The mission also stated, ³There is no clear organized 
resettlement, no non-voluntary resettlement, no recruitment,² although the 
Karabakh authorities did admit to assisting some of the settlers. The mission 
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placed the number of settlers at approximately 16,000 as opposed to the  
25,000-35,000 currently claimed by Azerbaijan. And, most important, ³most 
settlers interviewed by the Fact-Finding mission expressed a desire to return to 
areas from which they fled Š .² (7) The mission also noted the difficult 
humanitarian conditions of all refugees from the conflict – many of whom 
continue to live in tents, abandoned rail cars and dilapidated buildings. This 
issue, as well as a prevalence of malnutrition among refugees, was also noted in 
the PACE report. 
 
 So where does this leave Azerbaijan and Armenia? Exactly where they were six 
months ago, which is exactly where they were 10 years ago. Despite the 
attempts by Azerbaijan to generate interest in the Karabakh conflict, and to 
receive support for its desire to retake control of at least some districts 
surrounding Karabakh, the OSCE Minsk Group Fact-Finding Report will help 
Armenia claim legitimacy for its control of seven districts bordering Karabakh. 
This claimed legitimacy then will contribute to a continued political stalemate, and 
the seeming belief of some – perhaps even within the Minsk Group – that the 
status quo is the best option currently available . 
 
 Azerbaijan has not helped its case with regular suggestions of increased military 
spending and the possible use of force. Azeri leaders must understand that this 
rhetoric can only strengthen the resolve of Armenia and Karabakh to maintain as 
much territory as possible. But perhaps that is part of the point. While the 
country¹s leaders would have been pleased to have the international community 
force Armenia to back down in some way, and while they favor the appearance 
of action, they are not prepared to move a millimeter toward compromise 
themselves. In a year that will see difficult parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan, 
and the possibility of a strong challenge from the opposition, the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict is the one real unifying factor available to the government. 
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 Azeri leaders undoubtedly would have loved to see Armenia condemned for 
illegal settlements in occupied territories, but the alternative – their continued 
ability to demonstrate ³strength² by loudly threatening a hated enemy – may be 
just as welcome. It is questionable, however, whether the fourteen families 
mourning their sons this month, and the future families who may have to do the 
same, would agree. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Wire, via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
"Tulip" revolution: what next? 
Two weeks ago, second-round voting took place in Kyrgyzstan's parliamentary 
elections. Protests had been occurring throughout the electoral process, but in 
the wake of a heavy defeat for the opposition in the second round, they 
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intensified. Although the numbers involved were significant, the demonstrations 
were largely centered in the southern part of the country, specifically the cities of 
Osh and Jalalabad. Bishkek and the northern part of the country remained 
largely unaffected. (1) 
 
President Askar Akaev and his government had been threatening to use force to 
ensure 'stability' since the start of the election period, and on 20 March, that 
threat was made good when OMON troops stormed several buildings in the 
aforementioned cities. The crackdown did not have the desired effect as the 
protests simply moved onto other locations, including airports and city suburbs. 
(2) 
 
On March 22, President Akaev announced his willingness to negotiate with the 
opposition. It seemed evident that the offer was rooted in two beliefs: first, that 
dialogue could prevent the northward spread of protests; and secondly, that he 
could capitalize on the disconnected structure of the various opposition factions 
in the country. 
 
If this was indeed the President's calculation, then it was in part mistaken. On 
March 24, huge protests erupted in Bishkek. Demonstrators, meeting almost no 
resistance from Security Forces, stormed the government compound, taking over 
the White House (President Akaev's residence), as well as one of the country's 
major state-run media outlets, KyrgyzTV. (3) President Akaev's location was 
unclear at the time, although it was later confirmed that he had fled to Moscow. 
(4) 
 
What was immediately clear was that the protests in Bishkek were not organized, 
but rather were a spontaneous outburst of anger at the regime. There was no 
evidence of centralized leadership, and the protests were not peaceful. Pitched 
battles occurred between pro-and anti-presidential mobs on the streets of 
Bishkek, and there was widespread looting in the city for several days. (5) 
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Hours after the White House was stormed, Kyrgyzstan's outgoing Parliament met 
in Bishkek to appoint an interim leadership. After several hours of voting, 
Kurmanbek Bakiev, former Prime Minister and leader of the People's Movement 
of Kyrgyzstan was appointed interim Prime Minister and President, while Feliks 
Kulov, the former vice-President (released from prison the same day), was 
appointed to head the country's law enforcement and security bodies. Roza 
Otunbayeva was made interim Foreign Minister. (6) 
 
The first order of business for the new government was to attempt to restore 
order. To that end, Kulov and Bakiev made television appearances requesting 
calm, and insisting that vandals and looters would be prosecuted if arrested. (7) 
On the 25th, the government apparently announced a curfew designed to clear 
the streets, and there were reports that a large police presence was visible again 
in the city. (8) The curfew was apparently a successful tactic, since by the end of 
the weekend the capital reportedly was calm again. (9) 
 
Having restored order, the Interim government was faced with the question of 
legitimacy. According to the Kyrgyz Constitution, new Presidential or 
Parliamentary elections cannot be held or viewed as legitimate until the 
incumbent President resigns officially. (10) Akaev, residing as a "guest" of 
President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, stated that the protests in Bishkek amounted 
to little more than an "anticonstitutional coup," and insisted that that he remained 
the country's sole legitimate leader. (11) Akaev's statement was clearly little more 
than bravado—realistically, there is no chance that his return to office would be 
countenanced in Kyrgyzstan. But Akaev's statement presented the Interim 
government with a problem, since Presidential elections had already been 
scheduled by Bakiev and the legislature for 26 June. (12) If new elections were to 
be legitimate, a resolution would have to be reached quickly. 
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A few days later, Akaev changed his position. Speaking in an interview on Ort TV 
in Russia, the ousted President announced that he was prepared to resign, if 
given "appropriate guarantees," (13) including "my personal safety and 
compliance with the law on guarantees of presidential activity." (14)  During the 
same interview, Akaev made clear that he would not negotiate with Bakiev or 
Kulov, but only with delegates from the newly elected Parliament, led by Speaker 
Omurbek Tekebayev. (15) 
 
A delegation led by Tekebayev departed for Moscow to negotiate with Akaev; 
after three hours of talks at the Kyrgyz Embassy in Moscow, Akaev announced 
that he and Tekebayev had agreed upon a formal, "good and historic" document 
for his resignation, which became effective on April 4. (16) Officially at least, 
Akaev is now able to return to Kyrgyzstan as a private citizen, but it seems 
unlikely that he will do so given the likelihood of "mass unrest" should he return. 
(17) 
 
Campaigning for the Presidential election to be held in June has already begun. 
The race is widely believed to come down to two candidates: Bakiev and Kulov. 
While Bakiev already has announced his candidacy (18), Kulov must wait for a 
Supreme Court judgment before he can announce his candidacy. In 2001, Kulov, 
in what was viewed as a political case, was convicted and imprisoned for 
economic crimes. Under Kyrgyz law, he cannot run for office until cleared. His 
lawyers have appealed the Supreme Court. As yet, no ruling has been given. 
(19) 
 
If his name is cleared and he decides to run, a presidential campaign between 
Kulov and Bakiev is likely to be unpleasant and fractious, since Kulov draws most 
of his support from the North, while Bakiev's power center is the South. (20) 
Additionally, there are professional differences between the two opposition 
leaders: on 30 March Kulov, stating that stability had been restored, resigned 
from his post at the head of law enforcement agencies. (21) The real reason 
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behind Kulov's resignation apparently lies in serious disagreements with Bakiev 
over appointments in the interim government. (22) 
 
In spite of these professional differences, Bakiev is striving to ensure that 
presidential elections are as democratic as possible. Two days after Kulov's 
resignation, Roza Otunbayeva announced that Bakiev had signed into effect the 
creation of a State Commission for the "political rehabilitation of Feliks Kulov," 
because he had been widely viewed as a political prisoner of the Akaev 
administration. (23) 
 
The situation in Kyrgyzstan remains extremely tenuous. If a two-horse race 
between Kulov and Bakiev does emerge, there is the potential of a serious North-
South split in the country. But the potential for a more serious "resolution" to 
Kyrgyzstan's leadership battle is also open: During Akaev's Presidency, Kulov 
served as Interior Minister (1991-1992), and Head of the National Security 
Service (1997-1998), successor agency to the KGB, (24) and he reportedly 
commands their loyalty. (25) At this point in time, the possibility that these 
agencies could intervene on Kulov's behalf cannot be discounted, but it must be 
stated that such an intervention would probably open the country to civil war.  
 
It seems unlikely that Bakiev or Kulov are willing to risk a divided country. It is 
possible therefore that some form of power-sharing agreement between the two 
candidates will be negotiated, whereby the loser in an election receives the 
Prime Ministerial post, while the other receives the Presidency. 
 
Uzbek opposition takes heart from Kyrgyz events. 
Three months after parliamentary elections in which no opposition candidates or 
parties were allowed to participate, (26) a leading opposition figure has spoken 
out about conditions in Uzbekistan, and the lessons being drawn from 
Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip revolution." Speaking at an undisclosed location in Tashkent, 
Nigora Hidoyatova, leader of Ozod Dehqonlar (Free Peasants Party) stated that 
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she believed that revolutions would have a ripple effect, spreading to other 
Central Asian countries. (27) Hidoyatova's party is viewed as a serious threat by 
President Islam Karimov's government because it represents a sector of the 
population which is extremely critical of Karimov, namely the farmers. Hidoyatova 
recently claimed that agriculture in the country represented little more than 
"feudal slavery." (28) In recent weeks, the government has cracked down on 
farmers, because they were planning to meet near Tashkent to form a National 
Association of Farmers to operate in conjunction with the Free Peasants Party. 
(29)  What is bound to give the regime more food for thought is the revelation 
that Ozod Dehqonlar apparently received a delegation from Vitkor Yushchenko's 
Our Ukraine Party last November, which provided them with "training" and 
"technical support" designed to help with future campaigns. (30) 
 
It has been suggested by some sources that there is to be a serious crackdown 
in Uzbekistan for the next year in advance of Presidential election slated for 
2007. (31) If this is true, Ozod Dehqonlar's leadership is likely to be one of the 
first groups targeted for arrest by the National Security Service. 
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